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Note

Second Class Speech: The Court's
Refinement of Content Regulation
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981).
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure
self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to
express any thought free from government censorship. The essence of
this forbidden censorship is content control. 1

L INTRODUCTION
There are two fundamental principles of the first amendment of
the United States Constitution.2 First, government cannot regulate protected speech on the basis of content;3 second, nonobscene
expression is protected.4 Both of these principles were disregarded by the United States Supreme Court in 1976 when it
decided Young v. American Mini Theatres,Inc.,5 and upheld a zoning ordinance which made concentrations of adult theaters unlawful. Young thus became the first Supreme Court decision to
squarely sanction regulation of protected speech on the basis of
content. 6 Until Young, the Court had consistently refused to allow
1. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. amend L The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech...." Id.
3. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
4. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971).
5. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For a discussion of the Young decision, see notes 33-39 &

accompanying text infra.
6. Perhaps United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court upheld O'Brien's conviction for burning a draft card in public, can be viewed as
Court-sanctioned regulation of speech based on content. See note 121 infra.
This Warren Court decision has since been interpreted as involving a regulation which only incidentally infringed on speech. See Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); cf. I TamE,
AMEmICAN CoNsTrT oNAL LAw § 12-6, at 594-98 (1978) (OB-ien was wrongly
decided because the Court refused to look at Congressional motive).
Much of the O'Brien rationale was undermined in Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405 (1974), where the Court upheld a defendant's right to display the
American flag upside down with a peace symbol on it. In Spence the Court
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regulation of protected speech based on content. 7 Since Young,
the Court has become increasingly tolerant of content-based regulations; however, it has never formulated an adequate model with
which to apply its content-based doctrine.
Recently, the Supreme Court limited the extent to which states
may regulate speech on the basis of content in Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim,s a case which is factually quite similar to Young
but reaches a contrary result.9 In Schad, the Court attempted to
harmonize its new content-based doctrine with traditional first
amendment analysis and thereby develop a workable model. However, the model set forth in Schad is difficult to apply in view of
prior Supreme Court decisions, and an examination of those decisions is necessary to provide a perspective from which to view
Schad and posit its impact on first amendment adjudication.
This Note will examine the Court's prior decisions regarding
the doctrine of content regulation and the insights into that doctrine provided by Schad. This analysis will reveal the difficulty in
developing a workable first amendment model for permissible content regulation. While the relationship of first amendment rights
recognized the communicative nature of the defendant's conduct, something
it refused to do in O'Brien.
7. Speech classified as "unprotected" may be regulated. Such speech includes:
"obscenity," Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and "fighting words,"
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See Comment, Fighting
Words Doctrine-Is There a Clear and Present Dangerto the Standard?,84
DIcK. L. REV. 75 (1979) (questions whether 'fighting words" remains a viable
doctrine). While commercial speech is protected, Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the
Court has indicated that commercial speech has a subordinate position under
the first amendment guarantees. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978). See Roberts, Toward a GeneralTheory of CommercialSpeech and the
FirstAmendment, 40 Omo STATE L.J. 115 (1979) (commercial speech is protected in a modified Court doctrine that gives it less protection than noncommercial speech). Commercial speech may be regulated on the basis of
content. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981), the
Court set forth a four-part test to determine the validity of a restriction on
commercial speech. It stated:
(1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction
on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks
to implement a substantial government interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to
accomplish the given objective.
Id. at 2892.
8. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
9. Both cases involved zoning ordinances which restricted some types of
speech. In Schad the zoning ordinance prohibited live entertainment while
in Young the zoning ordinance required a dispersal of adult theaters. For a
discussion of the distinctions made by the Schad Court between the case
before it and Young, see notes 105-17 & accompanying text infra.
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0
to local zoning power is beyond the scope of this Note,' an undercan
framework
amendment
first
standing of the Court's theoretical
be particularly relevant to zoning in view of the posture of the
Schad and Young cases, which both involved constitutional attacks on city zoning ordinances.

I.

CONTENT REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE

The Supreme Court's development of a doctrine regarding the
extent to which states may regulate speech on the basis of content
pervaded the 1970s.11 However, the roots of permissible content
regulation can be traced to the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire'2 in which the Court upheld Chaplinsky's conviction
under a statute which prohibited addressing "any offensive, derisive or annoying word" to persons in any street or other public
place.13 The Court found that Chaplinsky's statements to a city
marshall' 4 were "fighting words,"' 5 unprotected by the first
amendment, and in now famous dictum,16 stated: "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any constitutional problem."' 7 The Chaplinsky dictum led to a categorization test, under which speech is classified as protected or
unprotected based on its content.' 8 Under this test, if the content
of the speech is protected, the state can only impose reasonable
9
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech.'
10. The constitutional issues of local zoning power and the first amendment doctrines of overbreadth and time, place, and manner restrictions will not be addressed in this Note. For a good discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see
Note, FirstAmendment Vagueness and Overbreadth. TheoreticalRevision by
the Burger Court, 31 VAmD. L. REV. 609 (1978). For a discussion of zoning and
association rights, see L. TRmE, supra note 6, § 15-18, at 974-80.
11. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-18, at 672-74.
12. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
13. Id. at 569.
14. On a city street Chaplinsky had called a city marshall a "God damned racketeer and a damned fascist." Id.
15. Id. at 573. See Gard, FightingWords as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 577
(1980).
16. Cases in which the dictum was cited include: Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
20 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 461 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 26 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
17. 315 U.S. at 571-72.
18. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949). See also Goldman, A Doctrine of Worthier Speeck Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 281, 282 (1977) (Goldman
found the categories of unprotected speech to be "narrowly limited" but not
"well defined").
19. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
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While the categorization test was frequently replaced in the
1970s with an equal protection analysis, 20 it was recently used in
the symbolic speech case of Cohen v. California.21 In Cohen, the
Court found that a profane slogan on a jacket worn by Cohen in a
courtroom was a protected form of communication for content regulation purposes. 22 The Court, therefore, overturned Cohen's conviction under a breach of the peace statute, 23 finding that the
statute violated his first amendment free speech rights.24
However, the Court ignored the categorization test one year
later in the content regulation case of Police Department v. Mosley 25 where the Court struck down an ordinance which prohibited
all nonlabor picketing within 150 feet of a school. Mosley, a nonlabor picketer who was protesting a school's racial policies, was arrested for violating the ordinance. 26 The Court used an equal
protection test 27 to resolve the first amendment issue, concluding
that the regulation was not "tailored to a substantial government
interest" and "[t]herefore, under the Equal Protection Clause,

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

U.S. 77 (1949); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-First Amendment--Content Neutrality, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 456 (1978).
See notes 25-43 & accompanying text infra.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id. at 19. The Cohen decision is also important in its recognition of symbolic
speech as protected speech. See Note, Cohen v. California:A New Approach
to an Old Problem?, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 171 (1972). Additionally, it set a precedent for one's right of privacy while in public. See Haiman, Speech v. Privacy:
Is There a Right Not to be Spoken to?, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 153 (1972). Cohen has
been interpreted as overturning the Chaplinsky sensibilities test which protected a person's sensibilities while in public. See Goldman, supra note 18, at
283-84. But see Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor
Bicke Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California,
1980 DuKEiL. REv. 283 (Cohen v. Californiashows government cannot be the
moral director of public discourse but it does little else).
CAL PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970) prohibited "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person ... by... offensive conduct."
403 U.S. at 16. The Court set forth the first amendment test, stating "[I]n our
judgment, most situations where the State has a justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within one of the various well established exceptions
...
to the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or
content of individual expression." Id. at 24. Since Cohen's speech was protected, the Court used strict scrutiny to conclude that "absent a more particularized and compelling reason" the state could not make the speech a
criminal offense. Id. at 26.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Id. at 92-93. For a recent application of Mosley, see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455 (1980) (Court found that a statute which prohibited only nonlabor picketing violated 1st and 14th amendments).
408 U.S. at 95. The Court stated that the "crucial question is whether there is
an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential
treatment," id., of labor and nonlabor picketers.
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[would] not stand."28
An equal protection analysis was again used a few years later in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.29 Citing to Mosley as the proper

precedent, 3 0 the Erznoznik Court invalidated a city ordinance
which prohibited outdoor movies involving nudity.31 However, the
Court's use of equal protection analysis suggested that the ordinance would have been upheld had the city more narrowly tailored
its statute and presented some rationale for distinguishing movies
containing nudity from those without nudity.32 This opened a door
to allowing content regulation under a narrowly drawn statute if

supported by sufficient justification.
After Erznoznik the Court soon found such a regulation in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,33 where a Detroit zoning
ordinance which prohibited concentrations of adult theatres was
attacked. In Young, a plurality of the Court explicitly rejected the
proposition that some protected speech could not be singled out
and regulated on the basis of its content.34 Justice Stevens, writing
for the plurality, stated: "[A] line may be drawn on the basis of
content without violating the government's paramount obligation
35
Jusof neutrality in its regulation of protected communication."
36
tice Stevens, departing from prior cases, rationalized such linedrawing by focusing on the social value of the speech, stating:
[W]hether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why
our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve a citizen's right
37
to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in theatres of our choice.
28. Id. at 102.
29. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). The Erznoznik Court did not mention the use of a categorization test but simply stated: "[E]ven a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless there are clear reasons for the
distinction." Id. at 215.
30. Id.
31. The Jacksonville ordinance prohibited the showing of films containing nudity
in a drive-in theater only when the screen was visible from a public street or
place. Id. at 206-07. Jacksonville contended that the ordinance was designed
to protect captive audiences, to protect youths, and for traffic safety. The
Court questioned the city's justification for "distinguishing movies containing
nudity from all other movies in a regulation designed to protect traffic," id. at
215, and found the statute to be overbroad in meeting the city's interests. Id.
at 208-15.
32. Id. at 215 n.13.
33. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id.
36. The prior cases included: Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
37. 427 U.S. at 70. For criticisms of this rationale, see Goldman, supra note 18, at
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Such a formulation placed the speech in Young at a lower level
than political or philosophical discussion. Justice Stevens also
found that the burden on the "second class" speech was minimal
by using an alternative means analysis and reasoning that there
were alternative theatre sites available.3 8 He then upheld the zoning ordinance using equal protection analysis. 39
Armed with the Young opinion, the Supreme Court in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation4o found that the FCC could validly prohibit
"indecent" language. 4 ' A plurality of the Court in Pacifica affirmed the Young proposition that speech could be regulated
based upon its content. It again employed an alternative means
43
test42 to show the incidental effect on first amendment rights.
Together Pacifica and Young established the Court's recognition
of levels of protected speech and the propriety of using an alternative means test to determine the burden on protected speech.
Thus, under these cases, if there are alternative means available
by which to exercise first amendment rights, the burden on the
"second-class" speech is minimal, and it may be subjected to content-based regulation. However, because this view was explicitly
embraced by only a plurality of the Court in both decisions, the
decisions were of uncertain precedential value.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

43.

300-01; Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres,Inc.: Creating Levels of Protected Speech, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 321, 358-59 (1977).
427 U.S. at 71-72 n.35. Justice Stevens referred to the district court finding
that" '[t] here are myriad locations in the City of Detroit which must be over
1,000 feet from existing regulated establishments. This burden on First
Amendment rights is slight."' Id. (quoting Nortown Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs,
373 F. Supp. 363, 370 (E.D. Mich. 1974)). Cf.Note, Zoning Content Classifications for Adult Movie Theatres, 22 Loy. L. REV. 1079 (1976) (questioning
whether the Court will adopt an alternative means test as to time and
manner).
Justice Stevens found that the distinction the ordinance made between adult
theaters and other theaters was "justified by the city's interest in preserving
the character of its neighborhoods." 427 U.S. at 71.
438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, a George Carlin monologue tape entitled
"Filthy Words" was played on a radio station during an afternoon broadcast.
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communications." This statute is part of a federal criminal code covering obscenity.
The Court stated: "Adults who feel the need may purchase tapes and records
or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear these words." 438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
The portion of the opinion relating to the alternative means test was joined
by a majority of the Court.
Id. A case decided after Young, Linmark Assocs. v. Willingsboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977), involved a challenge to an ordinance which prohibited the use of "For
Sale" signs in order to prevent white flight. The Court struck down the ordinance, distinguishing Young as involving a detrimental "secondary effect" on
speech while in the case before it the effect was "primary." Id. at 94. This
distinction was not used in Pacifica.
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While these cases do not present an analytically clear model,
there are at least four principles relevant to content regulation
which can be extracted from the Court's opinions: (1) different
classes of speech can be regulated based on content,44 (2) the content regulation issue may be analyzed in terms of the differential
treatment between classes of speech 45 using an equal protection
analysis which focuses on the relationship of the regulation to the
state's legislative goal,46 (3) an alternative means test may be used
to examine the extent of the burden on first amendment rights imposed by the regulation, 47 and (4) the level of judicial scrutiny of
the state's justification4 8 for the regulation depends on the social
value of the speech 49 and the importance of the state's interests.5 0
44. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
45. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult movies
with specified sexual acts versus movies without specified sexual acts);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (outdoor movies containing nudity versus movies without nudity); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (labor versus nonlabor picketing). See notes 25-43 & accompanying
text supra.
46. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) ('The remaining question is whether a line drawn by these ordinances is justified by
the city's interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods."). See
also notes 27, 32 & accompanying text supra.
47. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-72 n.35 (1976).
48. The level of scrutiny is unsettled. While in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville
the Court scrutinized each justification forwarded by the City of Jacksonville
for its ordinance, 422 U.S. 205, 208-17 (1975), in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the Court stated: "It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of
[the city's] decision to require adult theatres to be separated rather than concentrated in some areas." 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
49. The social value of speech was examined in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
where the Court stated.
These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends.
Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly
sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said. "[Sluch utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."
438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)) (footnotes omitted). See also note 37 & accompanying text supra.
50. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the Court stated: "[T]he city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be
accorded high respect. Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems." 427
U.S. 50, 71 (1976). The Young Court also made a distinction between viewpoint and subject-based regulations. The Court stated:
[TIhe regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be
exhibited is unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical
message a film may be intended to communicate; whether a motion
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Although these principles were affirmed in Schad, the Court
changed the focus from the social value of the speech to the drafting of acceptable statutes.
II. ANALYSIS
A.

The Schad Decision

In Schad, the defendants operated an adult bookstore in Mount
Ephraim, New Jersey, where they installed coin operated mechanisms through which a customer could view a live nude dancer behind a glass panel. The defendants were convicted and fined for
violating a city zoning ordinance which did not list their activity as
a permitted use.5 1 The New Jersey Superior Court affirmed and
the New Jersey Supreme Court denied review.5 2 The United
States Supreme Court overturned their convictions, finding the ordinance an overbroad infringement of first amendment rights.5 3
Justice White, writing for the majority,5 4 began his opinion by
accepting the New Jersey courts' determination that the Mount
picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, the
effect of the ordinances is exactly the same.
Id. at 70. Cf. Goldman, supra note 18, at 293 (an ordinance cannot "discriminate between adult films which praise Communism and those which ridicule
it").
Professor Geoffrey Stone in his article Restrictions of Speech Because of
its Content The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHL L.
REv. 81 (1978), defined subject-based regulations as "content based restrictions defined in terms of expression about an entire subject, rather than in
terms of a particular viewpoint, idea, or item of information." Id. at 83. He
contended, however, that the Court has failed to recognize such restraints "as
a separate class of restraints on speech." Id. at 115.
51. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 64 (1981). MouNT EPHRAnM,

N.J., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 99-15B provided:
B.

Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings.
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes
for sit-down dinners only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as but not limited to food, wearing
apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry, paint,
wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, pharmacy, liquors, cleaners, novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops
for shoes, jewels, clothes, and appliances; barbershops and
beauty salons; cleaners and laundries; pet stores; and nurseries

(2) Motels.
Section 99-4 provided: "All uses not expressly permitted in this chapter are
prohibited." Id. § 99-4. Contrary to the lower court's interpretation in Schad,
see 452 U.S. at 64-65, the Mount Ephraim ordinance could also prohibit nonlive entertainment, e.g., movies.
52. 452 U.S. at 65.
53. See id. at 74-77.
54. Justice White was joined in his opinion by Justices Marshall, Brennan, Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun. Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion concur-
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Ephraim ordinance excluded all "live entertainment" in the Borough. 55 With this premise in hand, Justice White approached the
case by focusing on the right infringed rather than the zoning
power exercised. This approach placed Schad in the 5first
amend6
ment sphere involving a regulation based on content.
Given this first amendment posture, Justice White identified
the speech infringed as live entertainment, including nude dancing.57 With the infringement identified, he set up a middle tier
equal protection test,58 stating: "[W] hen a zoning law infringes
upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest."5 9 Mount
Ephraim asserted that the ordinance served its interests in helping
create a commercial area "cater [ing] only to the 'immediate needs'
of its residents" and in avoiding problems "such as parking, trash,
police protection, and medical facilities." 60 Justice White found
ring in the judgment. Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.
See note 63 infra.
55. 452 U.S. at 65. The Court indicated that the ordinance might exclude only live
entertainment in commercial establishments, id. at 66 n.5, but that its decision would be similar if the ordinance excluded only the nude dancing in-

56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

volved in the case. See id. at 73-74 n.15. Some live entertainment was
permitted under the ordinance as a nonconforming use, id. at 64 n.3; the
Court indicated that this undermined Mount Ephraim's case. Id. at 73 n.14.
Various interpretations of what the ordinance banned seemed to bother
the Court. Id. at 67 n.6. The Court indicated that it would have reached the
same result if the ordinance were interpreted to ban all entertainment. Id. at
72 n.12. Given this ambiguity, the Court was probably more likely to use the
overbreadth doctrine. See note 56 & accompanying text infra.
The first amendment focus of the case is also demonstrated by Justice
White's application of the traditional first amendment overbreadth doctrine.
452 U.S. at 66. This doctrine provides that a party may challenge the validity
of a law on overbreadth and vagueness grounds as the law applies to others.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). In Schad,
Justice White stated. "Because appellants' claims are rooted in the First
Amendment, they are entitled to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the
expressive activities of others as well as their own." 452 U.S. at 66. This is
commonly called the Thornhill doctrine from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940). Justice White did not mention the possible use of Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), to prevent the application of the overbreadth
doctrine. Broadrick does not allow overbreadth challenges to statutes on the
basis of how the statute affects third parties, particularly where conduct is
involved, unless the overbreadth is "real" and "substantial" and the statute is
not subject to a narrowing construction. Id. at 615-16. See Note, supra note
10.
452 U.S. at 65-66.
This middle tier test has been used to review classifications based on gender,
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and illegitimacy, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978).
452 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 72-73.
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the ordinance to be overbroad in relation to the governmental interests it purportedly served. 61 He reversed the New63 Jersey
courts, 62 thereby overturning the appellants' convictions.

B. Why Protect the Speech?
The initial questions in analyzing first amendment cases are:
(1) what is the expression being protected, and (2) why should it
be protected? The Schad holding was based on the ordinance's exclusion of live entertainment. However, the Court, in dictum, indicated that it could
have ranged from "all entertainment" 64 to only
"nude dancing."65 The question thus raised is why these forms of
speech should be included under a first amendment umbrella.
61. Id. at 72-76. Justice White found that the Borough's justifications were not
supported by evidence showing how they were furthered by excluding only
live entertainment. Id. at 73-74.
62. Id. at 77. The Camden County Court refused to view Schad as a first amendment case. The county court contended that the case involved only a zoning
ordinance. Id. at 64.
63. Id. at 77. Justice Blackmun concurred with Justice White's opinion, but separately emphasized that the appropriate test, while more than rational basis,
should not be unsurmountable when zoning infringes on the first amendment. He added that Schad should not be viewed as espousing a "reasonable
access" doctrine to be used in reviewing regulations. Id. at 78-79.
Justices Powell and Stewart also concurred with Justice White's opinion,
but felt that the focus of Schad should be on drafting. They contended that in
some instances zoning can be used legitimately to exclude all commercial
establishments or limit commercial establishments to essential services. Id.
at 79.
Justice Stevens did not join Justice White's opinion but concurred in the
judgment. He believed that the whole case turned on how the burden of persuasion was allocated because he stated: "[T] he record is opaque ... ." Id.
at 83. He faulted Mount Ephraim for this and therefore believed that it
should shoulder the burden of showing an adverse impact. Had Mount
Ephraim showed that this use introduced a "cacophony into a tranquil setting," id., he would have upheld the ordinance "even if the live nude dancing
is a form of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment." Id.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. They
framed the issue in terms of "the right of a small community to ban an activity incompatible with a quiet, residential atmosphere." Id. at 85. They contended that the overbreadth doctrine was misused by the majority in finding
that the right asserted encompassed "live entertainment" when the real right
asserted was "nude dancing." Id. at 86. They believed that protecting such
expression "trivializes and demeans" the first amendment. Id. at 88. Even
accepting the proposition that the expression was protected, they could not
ascertain how Schad could be distinguished from Young. They therefore
would have found the ordinance to be constitutional on its face and as applied. Id. at 86-88.
64. Id. at 72 n.12. See note 55 supra.
65. 452 U.S. at 73-74 n.15. The Court stated "Even if Mount Ephraim might validly place restriction; on certain forms of live nude dancing under a narrowly
drawn ordinance, this would not justify the exclusion of all live entertain-
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The reasons advanced by first amendment theorists for protecting various forms of speech range from protecting speech as an
end-in-itself 66 to protecting only speech necessary for self-government.6 7 One popular theory is a "general" theory under which the
value of freedom of expression is viewed from the standpoint of its
potential to advance individual self-fulfillment.68 This value is integrated with other first amendment values, such as advancement
of knowledge, discovery of truth, participation in decision-making
maintenance of a proper balance
by all members of society, and
69
between stability and change.
On the other hand, under a strict political value theory, the
value of freedom of expression is viewed as limited to expression
necessary for self-government.7 0 At first glance, live entertainment and nude dancing may not be protected under the political
value theory, however, they could easily be viewed as a means toward individual self-fulfillment as a sought-after form of entertain-

ment for some people. Nevertheless, there is language in Schad
which supports both the general and political value theories as the
rationale for protecting the speech involved. The Court grouped
the activity regulated in Schad with political and ideological

speech stating that all were protected. 7 ' Arguably, the Court recment or, insofar as this record reveals, even the nude dancing involved in this
case." Id. at 73-74 n.15. See note 55 supra.
66. See Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L
REv. 964 (1978). Baker used a liberty model of the first amendment and
found: "Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because
of the value of speech conduct to the individual. The liberty theory justifies
protection because of the way the protected conduct fosters individual selfrealization and self-determination 'without improperly interfering with legitimate claims of others." Id. at 966.
Similarly, Professor Tribe questioned whether freedom of speech is "in
part also an end in itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to become and the sort of persons we wish to be." TamE, supra note 6, § 12-1, at
576.
67. See A. MEIKnJOHN, PoLrrcAL FREEDOM (1965); Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand
Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971) (only explicit and
predominantly political speech should have preference to other freedoms).
68. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION (1970); Karst, Equality as a
CentralPrincipleofthe FirstAmendment,43 U. CL I. REV. 20,23 (1975) (one
purpose of the first amendment is to promote a sense of individual self-

worth).
69. T. EMERsoN, supra note 68, at 6-7 (values are integrated set of independent
values).
70. A. MEmIEOHN, supra note 67. Meiklejohn's model expanded as he included
within it communication necessary for voter objective judgment. He therefore found that writings ranging from documents to works of art, discussion
of opposing ideas, and the sovereignty of the individual in voting were necessary for voter objective judgment. Id. at 117-18.
71. 452 U.S. at 65-66.
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ognized that live entertainment, while not directly political, often
carries political views. Although this suggests a political value
analysis, the Court's premise that the ordinance was suspect because it broadly limited communicative activity 72 supports a general theory self-fulfillment approach.
Perhaps the most compelling and relevant theory in the context
of content regulation is the negative value theory. 73 Under this
theory, the value of freedom of speech is viewed as a restriction on
government suppression. Thus, expression such as "live entertainment" would be protected because
once we allow the government any power to restrict the freedom of
speech, we may have taken a path which is a 'slippery slope.' Line-drawing in such an abstract area is always difficult and especially so when a
government's natural inclination is moving the line towards more suppression of criticism and unpopular ideas. If one could distinguish between" illegitimate and legitimate speech, it may still be necessary to
protect all speech in order to afford real protection for legitimate speech. 74
The Court found this view particularly important in Cohen v. California.75 In Cohen, the Court, focusing on the bounds of the California statute, 76 stated: "[I]t is nevertheless often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions
in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style
so largely to the individual."77 Similarly, the Schad Court, fearing
the boundless nature of the Mount Ephraim ordinance, used the
first amendment overbreadth doctrine to prevent deterrence of
78
protected activities.
While there is support in the Schad opinion for each of the
three theories, the Court did not expressly endorse any one.
Whichever view the Court embraced, it did not use the Chaplinsky
approach, 7 9 used in FCC v. PacificaFoundation,80that expression
only has "social value as a step to truth."81 Such a theoretical base
would have the unfortunate effect of greatly increasing the Court's
scope of permissible content regulation because most speech is
72. Id. at 71.
73. .J.NowAK, IL ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,HANDBOOK ON CoNsTrrTToNAL LAw 718

(1978).

74. Id. See Stone, supra note 50, at 101-04. (content-based restrictions distort
the workings of the "marketplace of ideas" and violate the principle of government impartiality).
75. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See notes 21-24 &accompanying text upra.
76. See note 23 &accompanying text supra.
77. 403 U.S. at 25.
78. 452 U.S. at 66.
79. See notes 12-17, 49 &accompanying text supra.
80. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
81. Id. at 746. See note 49 supra.
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8
not intent on finding "truth." 2

Nor did Schad cany the same tenor as Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.,83 which used a political type model for finding value
in speech for which we would " march our sons and daughters off to
war."84 The Court in Schad found value in preserving live entertainment and thereby recognized that speech has value as expressed through different mediums whether the medium is
oratory, e.g., traditional political speech, or nude dancing.
C. What Level of Protection for the Speech?
After the Court decided that the speech involved in Schad was
"worthy" of first amendment protection, it determined the level of

protection by applying a middle tier equal protection test.8 5 This

raises the question of how the Court applied the model it explicitly
set forth.
A traditional first amendment analysis advocated by Professor
Tribe would require the Court to divide speech regulations into
two categories: (1) those aimed at communicative impact, i.e., regulation of the viewpoint expressed; and (2) those aimed at
noncommunicative impact, i.e., regulation for a government interest distinct from the viewpoint. 8 6 Professor Tribe believes that the
type of speech involved in the first category should be given full
traditional first amendment protection based on the rationale that
government should not restrict expression because of the ideas expressed.8 7 With respect to speech involved in the second category,
he believes that the Court should apply a balancing model on a
82. Cf.Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. I
REV. 422,443-45 (1980) (Chaplinsky exclusion approach is incompatible with
modem first amendment doctrine); Gard, supra note 15, at 577. (Chaplinsky
rationale should not be used to justify censorship of offensive words).
83. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See notes 33-39 & accompanying text supra.
84. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
85. See notes 58-59 & accompanying text supra.
86. L. TRME, supra note 6, § 12.2, at 580-82. Tribe defined communicative impact
regulations as those by which the government seeks to control expression
because of the viewpoint that is expressed. Noncommunicative impact regulations encompass government control of actions "because of the effect produced by awareness of the information such actions impart." Id. at 580. For
communicative impact cases, see: Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (defendant arrested for the statement on his jacket); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576 (1969) (defendant arrested for burning an American flag); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (defendant arrested for attending a meeting). For
noncommunicative impact cases, see: Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972) (ordinance banning noisy demonstrations upheld); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ordinance banning loudspeakers upheld).
87. L. TRmE, supra note 6, § 12.2, at 582. The regulation is unconstitutional unless
the government shows a clear and present danger or the speech falls within
an unprotected category. This is based on the negative value concept See
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case-by-case basis using unifying principles from past decisions
because the restriction is not for the ideas expressed but for another government interest.88 The Schad Court did not explicitly
apply this traditional analysis; instead it recognized that a protected liberty was infringed 89 without sufficient justification. 90
However, it can be argued that the Court implicitly used the traditional analysis. When the Court examined Mount Ephraim's justifications for the ordinance it looked at what the ordinance was
designed to prevent. After finding no sufficient justification for the
ordinance, the Court implicitly determined that the ordinance was
aimed at communicative impact. Thus, the Court may have believed that the ordinance was really aimed at stopping the expression itself and not devised for the interests asserted.
A self-proclaimed revisionist has criticized the traditional analysis,9 ' believing that a middle tier equal protection test should be
used in reviewing regulations that discriminate on the basis of content.92 If a regulation survives that test it then should be subject to
a balancing test based on the Cohen principles. 93 This is very close
to the test the Court set forth in Schad when it articulated a middle tier test and then claimed that the substantiality of the state's

88.
89.
90.
91.

92.

93.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (current clear and present danger
doctrine).
L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12.2, at 582. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
Id. at 72.
Farber, Content Regulationand the FirstAmendment: A Revisionist View, 68
GEo. L.J. 727, 747 (1980). Farber contended: "[O]ne flaw in the communicative impact approach is its broad definition of content regulation. Under that
definition, a regulation that affects all speech equally can still be considered a
form of content regulation if the justification for the regulation relates to communicative impact." Id.
Id. at 737-38, 747-48. Farber believes that the equal protection tests used in
illegitimacy and gender classification are appropriate to scrutinize regulations that discriminate on the basis of content. He gave four reasons to use
this analysis: (1) it is less restrictive on future legislative efforts; (2) it serves
to protect speech by making regulations take a broader form which the public
will be unwilling to tolerate; (3) it is easier to apply than a balancing test;
(4) it can reduce "chill" effects because it could invalidate an ordinance on its
face. Id. at 748 n.100.
Id. at 748. Farber set forth three principles to use in balancing:. (1) a consideration of only those justifications upon which the statute clearly focuses; (2) a
reluctance to add to the list of acceptable justifications for content regulation;
and (3) balancing with an awareness and sensitivity to first amendment values and precedent. Id.
Professor Farber ignored the Court's ability to make the necessary distinctions in first amendment areas. He also ignored the chilling effect on first
amendment rights caused by the use of a loose equal protection test because
of its lack of guidance to courts and legislators.
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interest should be judged by the Schneider v. State94 analysis,
under which the infringement of first amendment rights is balanced against reasons supporting the infringement. 95 From this
premise the Court proceeded to analyze the relationship of Mount
Ephraim's justifications to the ordinance. However, because the
ordinance was not drawn narrowly enough to meet Mount
Ephraim's interests, the Court did not have to balance the competthe contours of the balancing interests. Thus, it did not develop
9 6
ing test beyond citing Schneider.
To support its use of the middle tier test the Court cited two
zoning cases 97 and one first amendment case.98 Relying on these
cases, the Court indicated that Schad involved more than zoning
and that more than a minimal burden was placed on first amendment rights by the Mount Ephraim ordinance.
The Court applied the middle tier test by scrutinizing the distinction the Mount Ephraim ordinance made between the classes
of commercial uses which were expressly permitted and live entertainment which was not. 99 The Court determined that although
some forms of live entertainment could create problems not asso94. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In Schneider,the Court used a balancing test to hold inva-

95.
96.
97.

98.

99.

lid an ordinance which required a permit to canvas a public street with leaflets. The Court stated: "[T]he delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts
to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the [first
amendment] rights." Id. at 161.
452 U.S. at 68-70.
Id.
Id. at 68-69 n.7. In the first cited zoning case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court, using a rational basis test, upheld a zoning ordinance which restricted land use to one-family dwellings and defined family to
include related individuals or two unrelated individuals. n his dissent, Justice Marshall called for applying a strict scrutiny test because the ordinance
restricted the rights of association and privacy. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Belle Terre dissent became relevant in the second-cited case,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 444 (1977), in which the Court struck
down an ordinance which limited occupancy of dwellings to a single family
which was defined so as to restrict even some related individuals from living
with each other. The Moore case indicates that when a protected liberty (the
institution of the family) is involved, more than a rational basis test is
applied.
452 U.S. at 68-69 n.7. The first amendment case cited, United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), provides a test to be used when freedom of
speech is only incidentally affected. See note 121 & accompanying text infra.
In O'Brien, the Court upheld a statute forbidding the burning of one's draft
card. See note 6 supra. The defendant in Schad cited O'Brien as supplying
the appropriate test. Brief of Appellant at 18-23, Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
452 U.S. at 73-74. See generally Karst,supranote 68, at 20 (equality of liberty
is at the heart of the first amendment when content regulation is involved);
note 45 & accompanying text supra.
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ciated with commercial uses permitted under the ordinance, the
ordinance was not narrowly drawn to respond to whatever those
problems might be.100 By focusing the middle tier test on the tailoring of the statute to the Borough's interests, the Court never
had to judge "the substantiality of the governmental interests."'1o
The Court's use of the middle tier test and its focus on the ordinance's breadth present problems for legislators and courts in determining the scope of permissible content regulation and the
protection which must be accorded to first amendment rights. The
main problem is in determining the degree of scrutiny a court
must apply to government justifications for regulations of different
types of speech. In Schad, the Court did not blindly accept the
Borough's justifications for the ordinance but instead questioned
their applicability. This suggests that a greater level of scrutiny is
required than the minimal level of scrutiny in Young where the
Court accepted without question the city's justification for dispersing adult theatres. 0 2
A second problem arises in determining how substantial the
government interest must be to uphold a regulation which is narrowly tailored to serve the government interest. This
apparently
may vary depending on the content of the speech. 0 3
Finally, the Court's focusing of a middle tier test on the tailoring of a regulation to the state's interests*may jeopardize first
amendment rights. Under such an approach, resolution of first
amendment issues will depend upon how statutes or ordinances
are drafted instead of the importance of freedom of speech itself.
Hopefully, such an approach will not lead lawmakers to draft more
comprehensive statutes or ordinances which might avoid the problem of unjustifiable distinctions between classes of regulated
100.
101.
102.
103.

452 U.S. at 73-74.
Id. at 70.
See notes 113-17 & accompanying text infra; note 48 supra.
See notes 48-50 & accompanying text supra; Goldman, supra note.18, at 301-07.
Professor Goldman saw problems ahead for the Court if it adhered to the
middle tier equal protection test used in Young and in other content-based
regulation cases. He questioned how the Court would rank levels of speech,
the state's interests, and "the cause and effect relationship between the
speech regulated and the asserted evil the state is seeking to avoid." Id. at
301. He acknowledged that while there were problems with the categorical

approach, at least it provided ease of application and guidance to legislators.
Id. at 306. But see Karst, supra note 68, at 66-67. Professor Karst cited four

benefits of equal protection analysis: (1) it protects first amendment values
without attacking state interests; (2) a state can re-tailor its statute to meet
its interests; (3) it encourages an interventionist Court; and (4) equal treatment has emotional appeal to both justices and to the public. See also note 92
supra.
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speech. 0 4
D. Distinguishing Young
To determine what Schad portends for the future, one must examine the Court's reasoning in distinguishing Young v. American
Mini Theatres,Inc.105 from Schad. The Court found Young distinguishable because: (1) the Young ordinance placed a minimal
burden on first amendment rights, and (2) the City of Detroit in
Young presented evidence which justified the regulation's burden
on first amendment interests. 06 These distinctions, however, appear to be more of an implicit ranking of speech content than real
distinctions, since each distinction is either irrelevant or
superficial.
1. Burden on FirstAmendment Rights
The Court contended that Young placed only a minimal burden
on first amendment rights as compared to Schad because in Young
the ordinance merely dispersed adult entertainment, while in
Schad, the ordinance totally prohibited all live entertainment.
Phrasing the distinction in this fashion makes the controlling factor the scope of the ordinance and not its real effect on first amendment rights.107 Seemingly, this distinction would allow a
governmental body to burden first amendment rights if its jurisdiction were broad enough. As the majority in Schad noted:
[The Borough's] position suggests the argument that if there were countywide zoning, it would be quite legal to allow live entertainment in only
selected areas of the county and to exclude it from primarily residential
104. This is illustrated in Schad where the Court stated. "Mount Ephraim asserts
that it could have chosen to eliminate all commercial uses within its boundaries. Yet we must assess the exclusion of live entertainment in light of the
commercial uses Mount Ephraim allows, not in light of what the Borough
might have done." 452 U.S. at 75.
105. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See notes 7-9 &accompanying text supra.
106. 452 U.S. at 71-72. The Court stated[I]t was emphasized in that case [Young] that the evidence
presented to the Detroit Common Council indicated that the concentration of adult movie theatres in limited areas led to deterioration of
surrounding neighborhoods, and it was concluded that the city had
justified the incidental burden on First Amendment interests resulting from merely dispersing, but not excluding, adult theaters.
In this case, however, Mount Ephraim has not adequately justified its substantialrestriction of protected activity.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
107. For example, while the Detroit ordinance dispersed adult theaters, in a city
the size of Detroit this could have practically eliminated adult theaters which
would not hdve a feasible place to relocate. In Mount Ephraim, where potential live entertainment was totally excluded, the ordinance might have only
eliminated very few prospective business ventures.
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communities, such as the Borough of Mount Ephraim. This may very well
be true, but the Borough cannot avail itself of that argument in this
case. 108

This apparently permissible distinction based on the type of zoning involved has no substantive relation to first amendment rights.
In reality it is a mere factual distinction which the Court should
not rely upon in the future.109
It could be argued that a more severe burden on first amendment rights was effected in Schad because the ordinance prohibited all live entertainment while the Young ordinance was
restricted to nonobscene adult entertainment with specified sexual
acts." 0 However this is a questionable distinction in view of the
Court's dictum that it would have decided similarly had the Mount
Ephraim ordinance only prohibited the nude dancing involved in
the case."' Additionally, this distinction limits the Young decision to statutes which specify sexual acts for adult entertainment." 2 Such dividing of nonobscene nudity into grades would
seem to be a task the Court would not wisely accept because of the
burden it would place on the Court's time and the impossibility of
making relevant distinctions in this area.
2. Supporting Evidence
The Court also distinguished Young from Schad because, in
Young, there were findings by the Detroit Common Council"3
which supported Detroit's justification for the ordinance. The
Young Court did not scrutinize these findings but accepted them
at face value." 4 In contrast, in Schad, the Borough of Mount
Ephraim did not have evidence to support its justifications for the
108. 452 U.S. at 76.
109. This factual distinction has its roots in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), where the Court used an alternative means test with
respect to the place of exercising freedom of expression to show the limited
burden on first amendment rights. See notes 38, 43 & accompanying text
supra.
110. This distinction can be seen as implicit in the Schad opinion given the emphasis on the breadth of the Mount Ephraim ordinance. The Detroit ordinance in Young enumerated the sexual acts that would classify a theatre as
"adult." 427 U.S. at 53 n.4.
111. 452 U.S. at 73-74 n.15. See note 65 &accompanying text supra.
112. In Young, Justice Powell distinguished the Erznoznik majority opinion
(which he authored) by saying that the Jacksonville ordinance was not an
incidental restriction on the first amendment, as it was overbroad in prohibiting the "showing of any nudity, however innocent or educational." 427 U.S. at
83 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. 427 U.S. at 54-55. Detroit's reason for the ordinance was to "preserve the quality of urban life"; the Court felt this was entitled to great respect. Id. at 71.
See note 50 &accompanying text supra.
114. 427 U.S. at 71. See note 48 supra;cf. Goldman, supra note 18, at 286 (lack of
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ordinance; the Court did not accept the Borough's justifications for
its regulation but closely scrutinized them.n 5 Thus perhaps the
real distinction between Young and Schad was not the evidence
but the degree of scrutiny the Court applied." 6 This difference in
scrutiny could be related to the distinction the Court made between the extent each ordinance burdened first amendment7 rights.
As discussed above, this distinction has little substance." In using such surface distinctions, however, the Court must have implicitly ranked the speech in Young at a lower level than the
speech in Schad, thereby according each a different level of judicial scrutiny.
IV. SCHAD'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF
CONTENT REGULATION
The Schad Court refined the developing content regulation doctrine by: (1) articulating a middle tier equal protection test to be
employed in analyzing regulations of speech based on content,"n8
and (2) changing the focus from the social value of speech to the
drafting of acceptable statutes." 9 However, the extent to which
the latter effects a genuine refinement is clouded by the Court's
implicit changing of the level of scrutiny given to a2 0regulation
based on its view of the value of the speech involved.
Additionally, Schad reaffirmed the Court's use of an alternative
means test to judge the impact of a regulation on first amendment
rights. Further Schad is important because the Court did not use
the O'Brien test'21 used in Young by Justice Powell' 22 and subsescrutiny typifies open balancing when the government-stated objectives are

accepted at face value).
115. See 452 U.S. at 72-74; notes 60-61 &accompanying text supra.
116. See generally note 103 & accompanying text supra.
117. This relates to the distinction between nudity and adult entertainment with
specified sexual acts in ranking the importance of the speech affected. It also
relates to the distinction between total exclusion zoning and dispersal zoning. See notes 107-12 & accompanying text supra.
118. See notes 58-59 & accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 99-101 & accompanying text supra.
120. This was demonstrated by the Court's distinguishing Young from Schad. See
notes 113-17 & accompanying text supra.
121. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien set forth four requirements to be met to uphold a regulation that burdened first amendment rights:
[W] e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Id. at 377. See notes 6, 98 supra.
122. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-82 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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quently used by other courts as the proper test for cases of content
23
regulation.1
Schad will thus have an impact on judicial review of regulations
based on the content of speech. It provides the courts with a more
certain test to apply. Instead of questioning whether to apply the
Young plurality opinion124 or the O'Brien test, Schad sets forth a
majority decision which clearly calls for a middle tier equal protection test.12 5 Nevertheless, Schad does little to clarify the permissible scope of regulations based on the content of speech.
Schad will also have an impact on judicial review of zoning regulations, particularly those used to eliminate adult entertainment
establishments. If courts follow the distinctions made by the
Schad Court between the Young ordinance and that in Schad,
they will examine the burden an ordinance places on first amendment rights by focusing on the scope of the ordinance. 2 6 This may
lead zoning board authorities to encompass larger areas thus enabling them to exclude adult entertainment in certain areas under
the Young dispersal standard. In the areas of both speech regulation standards and zoning, legislators will be forced to sharpen
their skills in drafting regulations, while courts will have to
sharpen their skills in scrutinizing them.
V.

CONCLUSION

Court acceptance of a doctrine which allows regulation of protected speech based on its content is troubling for persons concerned with the degradation of first amendment rights. Justices
Stevens, Rehnquist, Burger, and White explicitly have accepted
the content regulation concept,127 while Justices Brennan, Mar123. E.g., Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115 (1st Cir. 1981)
(licensing adult entertainment); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal
Heights, - Colo. -, 625 P.2d 982 (1981) (zoning live nude entertainment).
124.. The Young standard, speecbfoi: which we "would march our sons and daughters off to war." 427 U.S. at 70 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion), is a difficult one
to apply. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
125. The proper application of the test, however, is unclear. See notes 102-03 &
accompanying text supra.
126. See Kacar, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 432 A.2d 310 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
The Pennsylvania Court in Kacar indicated that Schad was distinguished
from Young based on the burden on first amendment rights effected by a
total exclusion of the use involved. Id. at 316 n.8.
Schad also could increase the amount of evidence necessary to sustain a
content-based regulation. See notes 113-17 & accompanying text supra.
.127. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). See notes 33-39 & accompanying text supra.
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shall, Stewart, and Blacknun explicitly have rejected it.128 Justice
Powell has been the fragile swing vote on content regulation issues. Justice Powell has accepted the concept of content regula29
tion only if the impact on first amendment rights is incidental,1
otherwise he has explicitly rejected it.130 This balance in the
Supreme Court can now be subject to change with the retirement
of Justice Stewart and his replacement by Justice O'Connor. Depending on Justice O'Connor's view of content regulation, the balance in the Supreme Court can either be restored, or, in the
can become an acceptable doctrine
alternative, content regulation
3
for a majority of the Court.' '
David M. Scanga '83

128. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring); FCC v.

Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 762-77 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 88-96 (Blackmun, J., dis-

senting); id. at 84-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
129. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-82 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
130. FCC v. Paciflca Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 761-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
131. In Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 296 (1981), a university regulation prohibiting
use of university facilities for religious groups was found to be an unconstitutional content-based regulation. The Court struck down the ordinance using
a strict scrutiny equal protection test. Interests in religious freedom and association may have been the reason for the increased scrutiny. All the Justices joined the majority opinion except Justice Stevens who concurred in the
judgment and Justice White who dissented.

